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Masculinities and Child Soldiers in Post-Conflict Societies 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Naomi Cahn, and Dina Haynes 
 
A fairly substantial amount of literature has been generated over the years regarding the 
forms of masculinity that emerge in times of armed conflict and war (Goldstein 2001; Yuval-
Davis 1997). This war-focused literature (which links to, among other things, masculinities 
studies) has drawn from broader theoretical research identifying an organic link between 
patriarchy, its contemporary manifestations, and various forms of masculinity as they arise 
within societies and institutions (Connell 2005; Cohen 2009). It builds on, and extends, the 
more general scholarship that has deepened our understanding of how masculinities are 
constructed and differentiated (Chodorow 1994; Connell 1987; Dowd, Levit, and McGinley 
this volume). While the war literature has made significant conceptual and practical use of 
the term “masculinity” to explore the impacts and effects of conflict, the concept has been 
less applied and understood to be relevant in post-conflict and transitional contexts, as 
societies attempt to move away from conflict. We argue that masculinities theory and its 
practical implications have been significantly under-utilized as a lens to explore and address 
the ending of hostilities in violent societies (Connell 2005; Kimmel 2005). This Chapter 
suggests that with some notable exceptions (Theidon 2009), little attention has been paid to 
masculinities in conflict-ending contexts. Moreover, throughout the negotiation, 
reconstruction, mediation, and intervention phases, masculinities studies concepts and 
theorization have been underutilized and under-applied to the range of post-conflict actions 
and actors. Bringing masculinities into view in post-conflict settings provides a more 
thorough means and framework for addressing the complex social and political problems 
faced by societies seeking to move beyond violence.  
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 Conflicted and post-conflict societies are an ongoing source of international attention 
and resources. They are sites of extremity and instability in many regions. Their successful 
transition from violent to peaceful (and typically from illiberal to more liberal forms of 
governance) has regional and global implications. Understanding the relationship between 
communal violence, masculinities, and the intergenerational transmission of deeply 
destructive social behaviors should be fully integrated into social, political, and economic 
problem solving. Masculinities studies, then, has much to offer the seemingly intractable 
political, legal, and social problems that accompany violent hostilities.  
 This Chapter proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the application of relevant theoretical 
concepts to the conflict, post-conflict, and transitional terrains. We introduce and explore the 
key concepts of hegemonic and hyper-masculinity, drawing on a feminist approach to 
masculinities studies.  Part II addresses the complex interplay between victim and perpetrator 
status, and the difficulties for men in acknowledging their own experiences as victimhood. 
This section offers a more nuanced understanding of male victimhood in violent societies, 
and the silences and barriers that operate to deny the vulnerability of men. It begins the 
exploration, continued in the next section, of the effects of conflict on children, including the 
intergenerational impact. Part III focuses on child soldiers, one of the most visible and 
vulnerable populations affected by the hyper-masculinity of war. It applies theories and 
constructs from masculinities studies to address the resolution of social, political, and 
accountability issues that arise from the deployment of child soldiers in armed conflicts. We 
recognize that the application of masculinities theories does not offer a “one size fits all” 
solution to every conflict, nor will the issues experienced by and challenging child soldiers be 
identical across all contexts of violent hostilities. Rather, the knowledge base is one that can 
widen and deepen our perspectives on child soldiers and allow for creative interventions to 
support the resolution of a highly complex set of social and cultural issues. 
  
I. Hegemonic and Hyper-masculinities in Conflict Settings 
Masculinities theories and feminist analysis have not always worked in tandem, and only 
relatively recently have feminist scholars sought to address what masculinity studies has to 
offer feminist theorizing (Dowd 2010). Using the gender lens drawn from various strands of 
feminist theorizing (Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011), we start by asking the “man” 
question, interrogating where and how men are situated in relation to the creation, 
perpetration, and institutionalization of violence (Dowd 2010). In particular, how are men 
situated in relation to systematic and structural forms of violence aimed at the destruction of 
groups, communities, infrastructure, and social functioning? In what ways does hegemonic 
masculinity work, and how do masculinities operate to benefit even those men who are at the 
margins of masculinity norms and practice? Are there particular aspects of hegemonic and 
hyper-masculinity that operate in armed conflicts (and their aftermath) that can be 
differentiated from the forms that appear in comparatively peaceful societies? 
We start with the notion of hegemonic masculinity that defines a dominant conception 
of masculinity as “a man in power, a man with power and a man of power” (Kimmel 2009, 
61). Understanding hegemonic masculinity is critical to seeing how the manifestation of 
manhood in multiple societal settings reinforces the power that some men maintain over 
women and other men. Hegemonic masculinity affirms such characteristics as 
“heteronormativity, aggression, activity, sports-obsession, competitiveness, stoicism, and not 
being female or feminine” (Cohen 2009, 144). Hegemonic masculinity is “as much about 
[men’s] relation to other men as it is about relation to women” (Dowd 2008, 233). Somewhat 
ironically, even within the hierarchies of masculinity, subordinated masculinities can benefit 
from the social construction of male privilege and values. That hegemonic masculinities are 
embedded in multiple sites of social interface underscores their pervasive influence upon 
 social interaction between groups of men, within familial and communal settings for men, 
and between men and women.  
Much of the theoretical work exploring masculinities has been undertaken in western 
liberal societies. Many of the assumptions built into theorizing men and male experiences are 
grounded in empirical and anecdotal experiences of men living in western democracies, who 
have at least theoretical access to a range of social and other opportunities and where there is 
hypothetically greater capacity for social mobility. Important to our comparative application, 
Western societies are generally not perceived as having abnormal or excessive levels of 
violence, at least not as measured by conflict violence scales. Accordingly, in societies with 
fewer opportunities for men and in which access to social and economic capital is highly 
variable across social and cultural groups, the crossover and application of masculinities 
theorizing requires some adjustment. In societies where social choice and mobility is far 
more restricted and cultural assumptions about gender roles and expectations are far more 
deeply entrenched and immovable, conceptions of manhood may be more rigid and cultural 
differences as to familial role and communal roles may need to be integrated more fully into 
the analysis. 
A.  Conflict and Hyper-masculinity 
While some generalizations are accurate concerning the role of masculinities in violent 
conflicts, the societal context matters. In studying these contexts, masculinity cannot be 
essentialized based on a view that all men are violent and all women are victims (Abrams 
2010; Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011). We must also guard against the possibility that 
apparent challenges to masculinities practices can “[entrench] hegemonic masculinity in 
other ways by perpetuating gender stereotypes positioning all men as prone to violence and 
all women as vulnerable to victimization and displacing the men and women that operate 
outside these binary constructs” (Abrams 2010, 703). 
 Of particular interest to our analysis is the lens of hyper-masculinity, “a masculinity in 
which the strictures against femininity and homosexuality are especially intense and in which 
physical strength and aggressiveness are paramount” (Harris 2000, 793). Other kinds of 
masculinities coexist with hyper-masculinity, but in situations of conflict, hyper-masculinity 
plays an enlarged and elevated role. Its social traction is intensified when violence is 
endemic, and other strictures (social, economic, legal) are slackened; and the unloosening of 
these patterns and hierarchies is particularly fraught in the post-conflict process. 
An important reference point across both conflicted and non-conflicted states is the 
correlation (and in some societies the codependency) of hegemonic and hyper-masculinity 
with the role of the military. In the context of contemporary armed conflicts, the term military 
includes state military forces but also insurgent groups, secessionist movements, paramilitary 
organizations, and other non-state military entities. It may also include international military 
in the form of peacekeepers and hybrid groupings comprised of international and domestic 
military forces. The military is closely tied to manhood, and, indeed, militaristic actions are 
supported by an ideology of male toughness (Goldstein 2001; Theidon 2007). Hegemonic 
masculinity pervades and defines sex roles in the military (Abrams 2010). Men dominate 
most national and international militaries. A swathe of research evidences that the military 
trains its members to see desirable masculinity as intertwined with violence in an effort to 
create the appropriate mindset of soldiers who are prepared to fight aggressively to defend 
their countries (Baaz and Stern 2009). The military is designed around male images that 
“tacitly exclude others who contradict their image of the combat, masculine warrior” (O’ 
Dunivin 1997, 16-17). The military is also clearly identified with institutionalized and highly 
gendered practices including, until recently, homophobia and the exclusion of women from 
combat roles in many countries (Dunivin 1977). The opposition of military hierarchies in 
many states to the inclusion of openly gay and lesbian personnel is deeply implicated in the 
 maintenance of ostensibly heterosexual and singularly masculine cultures in the military 
(Kaplan 2003). By the time conflict ends, men who have acted militarily and the (generally) 
male political elite are deeply enmeshed in this cultural vision of manhood. As former 
combatants in Colombia explained to anthropologist Kimberly Theidon, for example, joining 
a paramilitary group allowed the men “to ‘feel like a big man in the streets of their barrios,’ 
to ‘go out with the prettiest young women,’ and to ‘dress well,’ privileges they insist would 
not have been possible if they weren’t carrying a gun” (2007, 76). The prevalence of this kind 
of masculinity poses complex issues for undoing violence, for mainstreaming gender 
equality, and for remaking societies that have been fractured and deeply divided. 
 Post-conflict societies present a unique and under-analyzed site of examination for 
masculinities. One of the main reasons for this lack of attention is the presumption that the 
post-conflict context is equated to peace and that the absence of war makes moot any analysis 
of masculinity, which is presumed to have been “tamed” by the end of violent contestation 
(Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011). This presumption is misguided. It fails to account for 
the many ways that the hyper-masculinization inherent in hostilities continues to affect 
societies and underestimates the ways in which pre-existing conceptions of masculinity 
influence the transition process. For example, women continue to experience intimate 
violence in post-conflict societies, and the locales of violence may shift in post-conflict 
societies such that many violent societies experience significant increases in ordinary 
criminality as hostilities technically end (Hamber 1998). Moreover, the transition process 
may attempt to reconstruct the patriarchal legal, social, and cultural institutions that existed 
pre-conflict (Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011). Thus, while armed conflict between 
combatants may end as a result of a peace treaty or ceasefire agreement, violence may remain 
a persistent feature of the social and cultural landscape of post-conflict societies.  
 Understanding what happens post conflict to men (and women) who have been violent 
in situations of armed conflict is essential to tracking these patterns of shift and movement in 
the sites of violence. Masculinities may also be critical to understanding why armed conflict 
reignites in many theoretically “post”-conflict societies, and why the long-term traction of 
peace agreements is limited (Collier 2009). Consequently, close attention to the forms and 
impact of masculinities in the post-conflict milieu is critical for the success of the transition 
itself. 
The post-conflict environment, like the conflict environment, is also “vividly about male 
power systems, struggles and identity formation” (Handrahan 2004, 433). There may be an 
enormous flux in the male post-conflict fraternity both on an individual and communal level. 
Moreover, international organizations and institutions, typically headed by male elites, are 
arriving to reconfigure the transitioning society. So, men who were in power are losing 
power, other men (domestic and international) are taking their place, and internationals 
(generally culturally and politically differentiated other males) are coming into a society to 
fill a vacuum. In this flux of come and go, the gains and losses made by men as individuals or 
men as representatives of social, cultural, or political groups are critical to the long-term 
success of the transition from war to peace. Of particular relevance is what happens to the 
men who symbolically or practically “lose” the war. In assessing this loss, the tools of 
masculinities scholarship can evaluate the consequences of these perceived failures on men’s 
own professed self-worth, when value is based upon traits of strength, success, and control in 
“making” and respecting the man. The ongoing pressure to conform to the idealized version 
of manhood in a society where social and economic choices are few may be organically 
linked to the repeat player problem in internal conflicts. This challenge is generally engaged 
by having the same actors cyclically engaged in violence, then cyclically disarmed and 
demobilized, only to return to armed combat again. Perpetual cycles of violent conflict 
 intractability may be related to the cultural vision of manhood that props up ongoing 
reversion to violence, to “securing the win,” as much as to other economic and political 
factors. 
One enduring question that emerges from the conflict and masculinities literature is–
why do men engage in violence? To begin with, violence, as an aspect of masculinity, is 
deeply linked to the assertion of social status and the value of self in particular contexts. 
Violence may literally “make the man” in many societies, and not infrequently the site of the 
violence is the woman’s body. Recent empirical studies investigating why men rape expose 
the fact that soldiers “explicitly link their rationale for rape with their inabilities (or ‘failures’) 
to inhabit certain idealized notions of heterosexual manhood” (Baaz and Stern 2009, 497). 
Indeed, soldiers pointed to the discord between their embodied experiences and their 
expectations of themselves as soldiers (men) in the armed forces as a site of frustration, 
negotiation, and an underlying incitement to sexual violence (ibid.).  
While the causes of violence and conflict in a range of societies are complex (Scherrer 
2002), a number of cluster causalities are useful to identify. Violence is typically associated 
with the following: first, economic and social insecurity; second, a lack of legal and political 
status particularly associated with group or ethnic identity; and third, the lack of opportunity 
for meaningful self-determination (whether external or internal) within the state. In multiple 
contexts, engaging in violence is a rational choice for men when few other opportunities may 
be provided to gain economic security (albeit that participation in violence provides a highly 
tenuous economic existence or longevity), social status and value within their communities, 
and security (again albeit tenuous and fragile) for their families and communities. 
The existence of such deeply rooted links between the constructions of the masculine 
self and the social acceptance of “manhood” means that uncoupling the political contexts 
which bring about the formal end to hostilities from broader social and cultural contexts that 
 produce certain kinds of masculine behaviors and values is complex. The end of violence is 
not a superficial engagement, but may require deep and difficult entanglement with the 
masculine construction of self in many societies. In post-conflict societies, where there is no 
functioning governance or economic structure, such conundrums are compounded by the lack 
of other opportunities available to men to assert positive masculinities.  Such positive 
masculinities include caretaking and support roles, roles that evidence nurturing capacity, and 
engaging in a broad range of social and economic activities that in highly gender stratified 
societies would be gendered female.  
B. Masculinities and the Ending of Conflicts 
This question of violence and its ending is central to the post-conflict experience because the 
cessation of public violence between (generally) male combatants is usually the litmus test 
for evaluating the success of the transition from war to peace. We take issue with the 
presumption that the end of public violence and the measurement of security based on the 
safety of male combatants should constitute an adequate calculation of peace in any society. 
Instead, achieving peace requires accounting for, and directly addressing, the causes of 
violence, a process that requires engaging inter alia with hyper-masculinity. Of course, issues 
of causality are extremely complex, dependent on variations in social and cultural contexts. 
Nonetheless, post-conflict literature has begun to explore the strong overlap between the 
causes of violence and the emergence of certain forms of masculinity in conflicted societies. 
If we fail to address the causalities discussed above within a framework that integrates gender 
and masculinities, we may also fail to address the ongoing realities of how masculinities 
closely interconnect with post-conflict social, political, and economic outcomes. 
In addition to recognizing the forms and patterns of masculinities emerging in conflict 
and post-conflict situations we must also acknowledge the specific masculinities associated 
with international intervention and the cadre of male elites who come into conflict endings 
 exercising multiple roles and functions. Beyond a more nuanced recognition of these 
international masculinities, we also want to address the complex set of role assumptions for 
men and women in post-conflict societies. This requires asking the fundamental question of 
what does it mean “to be a man” in a violent society, when violence begets status and 
economic capacity? What happens to such masculinities when societies transition from 
violence and move towards democratic or more liberal forms of political engagement? Which 
men lose and gain in such contexts? What happens to women when men experience this role 
instability? As both Brandon Hamber and Amy Maguire have explored in post-apartheid 
South Africa and transitionary Lebanon, respectively women often bear the brunt of the flux 
in masculine roles (Hamber 2006; Maguire 2009).  
 Formal (equality) gains made by women in many post-conflict legislative and 
constitutional enactments conjoin with the political displacement of power for many men 
from the traditional routes provided during armed conflict to create a complex social and 
legal terrain. It is upon this territory that women’s gains and their intersection with 
masculinities in flux are played out. Formal gains for women may, in fact, be nullified or 
significantly constrained by the reality of social and community context, in which the 
accommodation of men’s deeply entrenched social status may outweigh the enforcement of 
formal legal norms in practice. Moreover, the social realities that women confront in highly 
patriarchal societies are propped up and perpetuated by masculinities in action—limiting the 
reach of law in subtle and crosscutting ways. 
  It is also vital to contextualize the reality of economic fragility faced in post-conflict 
zones around the world. Countries emerging from conflict are some of the poorest on the 
planet. Consider that, as of 2008, Somalia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was 
$600; Rwanda’s GDP per capita was $1000; Burundi’s GDP per capita was $400; and 
Colombia’s GDP per capita was $8800 (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). They have the 
 highest number of refugee populations (who are predominantly female with child 
dependents) and internally displaced persons. For example, as of January 2009, Rwanda 
hosted 55,062 refugees; Somalia hosted 1842 refugees and 1,277,200 internally displaced 
persons; Burundi had 21,093 refugees and 100,000 internally displaced persons; and 
Colombia had 170 refugees and 3,000,000 internally displaced persons (UNHCR 2009). In 
this context, when one domain of status and economic subsistence is closed off (by the end of 
violent armed conflict) such societies struggle to replace the dysfunctional economy of war 
with a functional liberal economy of provision. The tools that for some men provided a 
means of survival in war are unreliable and may no longer be needed. Men and young boys 
who are under- or uneducated are at a considerable and material disadvantage in such 
settings. In this space of economic struggle, Gary Barker and Christine Ricardo illustrate the 
rise in the parallel economics of criminality and “normal” violence, which allow certain 
forms of masculinity to endure and provide both status and material gains (2005). They note 
the particular difficulties of confronting violent masculinities in social settings that have 
operated to seal off men spatially from women and children. This is further compounded in 
societies that have deeply stratified gender roles, leaving little room for the expression of 
positive masculinities in either the public or private sphere. The effects of such stratification 
are also intensified when one accounts for intergenerational transmission of violent norms, as 
well as in societies where age stratification is intense, creating intense competition for 
economic and sexual resources as well as opportunities (ibid., 12).  
II. Male Victimization in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings 
Rather than essentialize men’s roles during conflict as characterized by hyper-masculinity, it 
is vital to acknowledge that men and boys may also have been victimized throughout violent 
conflicts—possibly by abduction, possibly by sexual violence, almost certainly by the violent 
ritualization that frequently accompanies male initiation into predominantly male military 
 fraternities. A particular taboo is evident in recording or acknowledging the experiences of 
sexual violence by male combatants and male civilian bystanders.i 
In this context scholars have increasingly challenged the tendency to frame some sexual 
crimes, specifically the crime of sexual enslavement, as one that predominantly describes the 
experiences of women and enslavement simple (without a gender based dimension) as only 
affecting men and boys (Oosterveld 2010). In such a limited gender analysis “men are ‘just’ 
slaves whilst their female counterparts are ‘just’ raped” (ibid, 4) The approach fails to 
account for the ways in which in the context of enslavement of boys, sexual vulnerability is 
ever present and sexual and reproductive ownership limits the ways in which boys’ sexual 
development and maturing is controlled and exploited (ibid.; Bridgewater 2005). Essentialist 
constructions are clearly overly simplistic and fail to account for the totality of violence and 
harm experienced by men, women, boys and girls in conflict contexts.  
As Chris Dolan has noted in the context of documenting the rape of men in Northern 
Uganda, male rape is little discussed (Neumann 2009). Male rape practices in this setting 
were viewed as an affront to male identity and to the society as a whole and discounted or 
under-acknowledged in social and political settings. Violent sexual attacks on men were 
viewed as an attack on the integrity of the community (more so even than the rape of 
women), but in practice were downplayed in terms of their actual occurrence and little 
support or social sympathy was forthcoming for victims.ii  
The taboo on addressing male victimization trickles down from the dominance of 
hegemonic masculinity in which to be a victim is to be relegated to a domesticated and 
vulnerable status. To be the male victim of sexual violence is to be defined in womanly terms 
as “soft and weak and incompetent” (MacKinnon 1982, 530). There is some nascent literature 
that suggests a link between sexual violence of men by men and deeply rooted practices of 
feminization (UN OCHA 2008). In this telling, sexual violence experienced by men is a 
 direct playing out of wider social (and violent) practices that are generally directed toward 
women. For many men who experience rape, the result is to undermine their own masculinity 
in fundamental ways and put in doubt their sexual identity. Based on homophobia, many 
societies stigmatize the existence of male/male rape because it involves sexual activity 
between men and is viewed as indicative of homosexuality regardless of the coercion 
involved (Sivakumaran 2005). Sexual violence experienced by men is, we know, 
significantly underreported, although empirical proof other than anecdotal evidence is 
difficult to establish. The statistics of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) suggest that men may underreport (even as the statistics illustrate that women are the 
most prevalent victims of sexual violence). Of the 538 cases of sexual violence reported to 
the TRC, 527 correspond to women and only eleven were attributed to male victims 
(Duggan, Bailey, and Guillerot 2008). As is generally noted in the context of sexual violence 
experienced by women, underreporting is rife, and we do not have a deep understanding of 
the form, dynamics, and scale of sexual violence that men experience in times of conflict. To 
do so requires not only seeing how hegemonic and hyper-masculinities underpin the 
experience of and response to sexual violence as it affects men, women, and the communities 
they belong to but also how it disempowers men and boys from reporting their experiences.  
Male victims may feel caught between the hyper-masculinization of war and their own 
feelings of vulnerability and stigma (Gettleman 2009). Facilitating acknowledgement of the 
experiences of violation by men and boys, ensuring reporting, and advancing healing requires 
developing programs to aid this population. These programs might include specially trained 
counselors, targeted educational opportunities for boy soldiers, and specific health care 
measures. Critical in addressing victimization and powerlessness is identifying ways in which 
victims, male and female, can benefit from forms of social and economic empowerment and 
 from the development of positive role models that may help them address and move past their 
victimization. 
III. Child Soldiers and Intergenerational Transmission of Violent Norms 
Male and female child soldiers present particular challenges to post-conflict reconciliation, 
and occupy a unique space by inhabiting the boundaries of being both victims and 
perpetrators simultaneously (Rosen 2009). Regardless of whether they are subjected to 
socialization into the military as arms-bearing soldiers, as porters, or camp followers, they 
provide an important subject for masculinities studies. The deployment of child soldiers has 
been a historical reality in many societies, yet legal developments recognizing the rights of 
the child through international treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) have transformed international and domestic approaches to the use of children as 
soldiers and to the imposition of any criminal penalties they might face as a result. The first 
contemporary legal deterrent to using children as combatants came with Protocol I Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, which makes some advances but does not appear to be 
an outright prohibition on child combatancy.iii Despite this and the development of 
international prohibitions on the use of child soldiers, much legal and cultural work remains 
to be done in setting generally agreed and enforced international standards on the use of 
persons under 18 in military contexts (Hamilton and Abu El Haj1997). The difficulties are rife 
as treaty provisions continue to make a distinction between persons under 15 years of age, for 
whom the prohibitions are generally robust and absolute, and those between 15-18 years old, 
who can be voluntarily conscripted into military forces.iv The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts 
(Child Soldiers Protocol), which specifically addresses the practice of recruiting and using 
children as soldiers in armed conflict, bans the use of children under the age of 18 in armed 
conflicts, although it does permit the voluntary enlistment of 16 and 17 year-olds into armed 
 forces (Optional Protocol 2000). It has not, however, been ratified universally (Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008; UNICEF 2006). Variable criminal standards across 
multiple jurisdictions on the age at which a child can be held criminally accountable for 
various crimes also compound the difficulties in setting coherent and generally agreed 
standards on minor responsibility in law. Estimates vary as to the numbers of children 
conscripted into state military forces, militias, and other non-state forces, but may be as high 
as 300,000 in a given year (Drumbl 2011; E. Kaplan 2005), and they can constitute a 
significant fighting force. The term “child soldiers” is broadly defined to include all children 
associated with armed groups, and their roles range from combatants to cooks, porters, or 
camp followers who are used for sexual services (Fujio 2008; Knudsen 2004). The 
disarmament of child soldiers must resolve thorny legal, moral, and programmatic questions. 
They include the following: 1) rehabilitating children who have committed serious and 
systematic human rights violations; 2) ensuring that such children are accepted by their 
families and communities when the victims of their crimes may have been family or 
community members; 3) determining whether child soldiers are eligible for asylum under 
refugee law or must be barred for having persecuted others; 4) addressing the educational and 
health needs of boy and girl soldiers in societies with scarce resources; 5) finding ways to 
address the needs and rights of those victimized by child soldiers; and 6) satisfying the 
demands for criminal accountability in post-conflict societies. In a broader view, the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers is critical to the long-term stability of violent 
societies as we increasingly understand the intergenerational effects of armed hostilities over 
the medium and long term. Children who have absorbed and acted out violent norms pose 
immense challenges to the sustainability of peace and to the broadest possible realization of 
stability and security. 
 One starting point for the application of masculinities studies is the recognition that boys 
are typically inculcated into cultures whose normative underlay is based on the suppression 
of emotion. The perceived success of a boy’s development (for himself and his family) will 
be the expression of strength both physical and emotional and the rejection of weakness 
(judged in similar terms) (Gilmore 1990; Kimmel 2004). The particular weight of 
responsibility that falls on boys to fulfill masculine and productive expectations from a very 
early age must be more fully considered in the broader masculinities literature. In societies 
that experience entrenched and cyclical violence, these pressures are present in concentrated 
form. When familial and communal structures operate within the dual expectations of the 
inevitability of violence and of a man’s commitment to and support of military action, the 
pressures for the boy-child and the absorption of hyper-masculinity norms comes early and 
intensely. Moreover, the range of choices offered to or closed off from the boy-child as 
combatant in waiting should not be underestimated. Here hegemonic masculinity theory 
concerning violence as extensions of “normal” masculinity has a particularly deep resonance 
(Abrams 2010, 714). Moreover such expectations, reinforced by the normality of hostilities, 
in turn highlight the need for a man to define his masculinity by defending his family, both in 
the literal and real sense (Gilmore 1990). These messages are clearly carried across 
generations. In Northern Ireland for example, empirical research examining the murderous 
targeting of Protestant male heads of household in borderland farming communities (a form 
of ethnic cleansing) illustrates the enormous social pressures on young men (sons left behind) 
to protect land and family (and equally become the next subject of paramilitary targeting) 
(Simpson 2009).  
The transmission of intergenerational expectations compounds the entrenchment of 
stratified gender roles, and can nullify any attempts to advance gender equality and the 
loosening of gendered expectations around caring and parenting for women. The core point is 
 that conflicted societies can mummify highly gendered role expectations for men and for 
women from early childhood in ways that are quantifiably more intense than in societies not 
experiencing communal violence. Additionally, in societies experiencing ethnic or religiously 
driven hostilities, the overlay of “othering” that accompanies the construction of the social 
and masculine self is profoundly linked to the reproduction of violence through the 
generations and the valuing and self-identification of the man through violent action. In such 
contexts, when children engage in violent activities, consent is a highly fraught measurement 
given the longitudinal socialization to violent norms that may be endemic to upbringing in 
particular communities.  
Child soldiers are a complex group who cannot be essentialized as victims or violent 
actors (Drumbl 2011). There are numerous factors that influence children to join armed 
movements voluntarily (or at least without physical coercion), including the poverty in which 
they live and the lack of opportunities for education or ultimate employment. While not all 
poor children living in conflict zones become soldiers, it is poverty and conflict that prevent 
them from attending school or that result in the death of family members who might 
otherwise provide counsel. One study found that 80% of child soldier recruits, compared to 
20% of a control group of children who had not become soldiers, observed conflict near their 
homes (Cahn 2006). Serving with an armed force also can be seen as providing various 
opportunities, including protection and training (Drumbl 2011; Amnesty International 2010). 
Adolescents who are working or who are in school and doing well are much less likely 
sources of recruits than unemployed children with no opportunity for school (Cahn 2006). 
Joining an armed group provides adolescents with the potential for adventure (ibid.). 
Children may also join to take revenge against other armed groups who have killed family 
members. Additionally, both boys and girls may join to escape from oppressive home 
environments, although girls are far more likely than boys to claim that domestic violence or 
 feelings of exploitation were their primary motivation for joining. Once children become 
associated with armed forces, they undergo efforts to entrench and endorse violence, 
competitiveness, and destructive capacities; this may become a “proving ground for 
masculinity” viewed as a “rite of passage, transforming boys into men” (Carreiras 2006, 41). 
Through participation in conflicts, boys may feel that they have become men, and they may 
find male role models (Barker and Ricardo 2005). 
Child militarization also occurs through coercion, including conscription, abduction, and 
forced involvement in violent activities, the latter directly aimed at the families and 
communities they have been taken from. Here, the intended consequences are breaking down 
familial and social bonds, and destroying the community by the horrific manipulation of its 
most vulnerable.v In order to socialize children into the military, for example, their leaders 
“deliberately brutalise the children from an early stage, forcing them to commit crimes 
against their will. . . . Once on the frontlines, the process of brutalisation continues as 
children are repeatedly obliged to commit abuses, including murder and rape, against 
civilians and enemy soldiers” (Amnesty International 2003, 6-7). Equally evident are the 
unique vulnerabilities of young men and male children who have been conscripted into 
militias, insurgent groups, or paramilitary forces. As the initial indictments from the 
International Criminal Court illustrate in relation to the harms visited upon child soldiers, acts 
of sexual violation were intentional and systematic, clearly intended to break bonds between 
children and their families/communities of origin and force relationships of dependency and 
shame into the paramilitary organizations (ICC Warrant of Arrest 2006).  
Central to the reassertion of normality in many conflicted societies—as a bridge from 
war to peace—are DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) programs. Heavily 
endorsed and supported by international intervenors (whether states or international 
institutions), DDR has been the locus for addressing the neutralization as a military threat of 
 the combatant in the post-conflict state. DDR programs and accountability processes have 
generally failed to account for the emergence of masculinities in violent childhoods, and the 
“making of the man” in these contexts has long-term effects for the stability and peacefulness 
of a conflicted society. Demobilization programs that fail to account for the push and pull 
factors that lead boys into armed conflict cannot hope to effectively contribute to leading a 
country into sustained peace. The intergenerational transmission of problematic masculinity 
norms must be more clearly placed in the discourses of transition and peacemaking in order 
to render post-conflict programs more effective and relevant in securing their stated goal of 
rendering peace. 
Child soldiers may have become adults during the conflict, and will have the same needs 
as other former combatants for rehabilitation and reintegration. Effective and meaningful 
DDR would benefit from deconstructing and addressing positively the negative masculinities 
of militarization processes in which child soldiers have participated. Anyone recruited as a 
child, however, has also lost educational opportunities and family care and support, issues 
that must be recognized in any DDR program. Child soldiers who remain children also need 
services to help them find their families or, where the families cannot be found, make 
arrangements for foster care (YCare International 2008). Ensuring the integration of children 
more positively into their families offers some means to redress the complex roles that they 
must manage in the post-conflict context, helping them manage a transition away from the 
hyper-masculinizing process they have undergone during the conflict and offering positive 
alternatives. Educational opportunities provided as part of the DDR must recognize the 
special needs of children whose schooling and emotional development have been so violently 
disrupted, resocializing them to effectively dismantle individual and collective wartime 
behavioral patterns and mentalities. Another important and related move is to extend and 
broaden the categories of combatants for the purposes of DDR programs, ensuring that 
 children who have provided support roles to military or paramilitary forces (as well as those 
who have been involved in direct hostilities) are included and fully integrated into structured 
DDR programs. Inclusion in official and appropriately framed DDR programs can, again, 
help with moving away from a violent mentality instilled by conflict. 
Re-socializing former child soldiers requires integrating the information known about 
the effects of hyper- and other forms of heightened masculinities into the planning and 
delivery of the DDR programs that are generally constructed and supported by international 
actors. It means moving the emphasis away from merely handing over guns to neutral 
arbitrators and instead integrating psychological and reflective counseling into the 
demilitarization of combatants (Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011). Ultimately, and far more 
difficult, it requires providing other economic and social opportunities for boys and men to 
express masculinities in ways that are not socially and politically destructive.   
A key challenge is developing positive gender roles for young men and women who 
have been egregiously violent, and who have equally been deeply violated.vi These multiple 
contexts of male victimization (made more complex by the victims’ parallel roles as 
perpetrators) require melding into the programmatic structure of DDR programs. In 
particular, DDR programs need to develop special counseling and training programs 
addressing the harms experienced directly and more broadly, forcing difficult conversations 
about men’s roles post conflict (United Nations 2006; Bastick 2008). Post-conflict programs 
must be developed and carried out with an awareness and appreciation for the cause and 
effect of masculinities during war in order to effectuate post-conflict transitional goals in 
genuinely transformative ways.  
IV. Conclusion 
While violent masculinities are clearly and inexorably evident in conflicted societies, not all 
conflicts manifest similar kinds of violence, nor are the patterns of violence consistently 
 duplicated suggesting that masculinities are not evidenced in the same ways across all 
conflicts and that limits can be placed on male behavior in war. This insight has relevance for 
our understanding of how we address the manifestation of masculinities in conflict contexts. 
Recent empirical work reveals highly relevant variables to the forms and expressions of 
violence against women in situations of conflict, demonstrating not just the fact of variability 
but offering significant insight into the kinds of structural and institutional matters that can 
dampen certain kinds of violent expression in war, and, in particular, sexual violence against 
women and men (Wood 2006). Understanding violence and how to transition away from it 
involves identifying the forms of masculinity that emerge in violent conflicts and what limits 
can be placed on hyper-masculinities or the negative results of hegemonic masculinity in 
conflict contexts. Factors that limit the experience of harm in war for both men and women 
include restraining opportunity (namely, ensuring where possible, limitation on access to 
civilians from combatants), creating or lowering incentives to military personnel for certain 
kinds of violent action, and creating and enforcing a system of effective sanctions which is 
highly correlated to the effectiveness of military discipline within any military unit or entity 
(ibid.). These are all relevant frames to think about in addressing the management of 
inevitable conflict and to lessen violent impact for men and women.  
Post-conflict settings require addressing gender in multiple ways, including through 
close attention to masculinities as part of the high-priority (and funded) measures to end 
violence. Programs specifically focused on disarming and reintegrating former combatants 
need to account for masculinities in their mandates and program deliveries. They need to do 
so in a thoughtful way that integrates scholarly and interdisciplinary insights squarely into the 
policy arena. 
Masculinities discourses and theory have begun to transform scholarly and practical 
understandings of the methods and means of warfare, as well as to tease out the causalities of 
 war and the means to bring about an end to public communal violence between male 
combatants. In the context of post-conflict, peacemaking, and transitional discourses, 
however, attention to masculinities has been much less evident. Our contribution seeks to 
remedy that gap by bringing the theory and practice of masculinities discourses to bear on 
these fields, focusing on the particular vulnerability of child soldiers and the victimization of 
men during conflict. This Chapter has sought to rebut the general presumptions that 
masculinities disappear at the formal ending of hostilities and during the peacemaking phase 
of conflict. Rather, masculinities are ever present and deeply problematic to ensuring 
successful outcomes with a sustainable peace. In particular, we suggest that hyper-
masculinity maintains its presence in post-conflict societies—and is particularly manifest in 
the experiences of violence in the private sphere for women and the increases in criminality 
and “ordinary” violence in transitional societies. 
Notwithstanding the cultural, legal, and social variations between countries facing post-
conflict issues, the core issues around the centrality of gender remain universal. In 
undertaking this analysis, we are convinced that addressing gender and the differing needs of 
men and women is not only good policy and practice on its own merits, but that it also meets 
the first principle of conflicted and post-conflict societies—namely, ensuring that violence 
ends for all, is not reignited, and that peace is sustainable far into the future. 
 
                                                          
i It is important, then, to acknowledge the men who have recently come forward in the Congo to attest to having 
been raped by both rebels and Congolese soldiers alike. The American Bar Association, running a sexual 
violence legal clinic in Goma, states that more than 10 percent of its rape cases in June of 2010 were men who 
were then cast out by their villages and families, shamed and referred to as “bush wives,” the pejorative term 
used for years to describe women forcibly taken as sex slaves or “wives” of these same soldiers (Gettleman, 
2009). The experiences of these men were later discounted.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ii In the documentary film Gender against Men in which one individual gives evidence about the experience of 
being raped 20 years earlier, the testimony itself is highly unusual. In the field where the testimony was taken, 
the speaker was shouted down in a communal setting, as if the community as a whole did not want to “hear” 
what had been done. 
iii Article 77(2) states that: “The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall 
refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the 
age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.” 
iv The European Convention on Human Rights allows for voluntary military service from the age of 16. See 
also, ICCPR standard and jurisprudence. As regards the Geneva Conventions: there are six articles which 
specifically concern children under the age if fifteen in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Of those articles 
half apply to the general child population of a state party whilst the other half apply to children who fall under 
the remit of protected persons.  
v Child Soldiers Global Report found at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/overview-and-benchmarks, 
which takes a country by country assessment of the numbers and experiences of child soldiers. 
vi Girls play a multitude of roles in conflicts, and are also socialized into violence. (Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 
2011).  
